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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST*
JOEL DAVIDOWt
N THIS ERA of relative peace, many nations, including our own, are focus-
ing more attention on important international economic issues rather
than on military or political questions. These current issues include how
to control abuses by multinational corporations, how to deal with com-
modity cartels, how to achieve a satisfactory transfer of technology to
less developed nations, and how to create additional export opportunities
for nations with a shortage of foreign exchange. In a broad sense, all
these subjects can be viewed as involving issues of international antitrust
or competition policy.
Because Americans have a deep commitment to the principles of free
enterprise and free competition, we have long supported vigorous antitrust
enforcement both in our domestic market and as to restraints on our
foreign trade. Moreover, we have quite successfully exported our antitrust
policies to other free world nations and have recently indicated our willing-
ness to support the embodiment of these principles in international agree-
ments applicable to all nations.' It has also been a cornerstone of American
policy that our antitrust laws are to be applied impartially with no preference
between domestic firms and foreign ones or between famous companies
and obscure ones. Moreover, the enforcement policy of our antitrust
agencies has always been to apply our laws so that they impose sanctions on
unjustifiable business behavior while allowing conduct which is reasonably
necessary for the effective conduct of business. Finally, we seek to apply
antitrust law internationally in such a way as to avoid unduly hindering
foreign trade or interfering with the legitimate sovereign rights of other
nations.
Of course, the test of all these policies is not how often or how
vigorously they are expressed in principle, but how they are carried out
*This article is based upon remarks delivered by Mr. Davidow at the Fifth International
Law Symposium held at the University of Akron School of Law on November 4, 1976. The
topic of the Symposium was "The Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to U.S. Corporations
Abroad." Other participants in the Symposium were James R. Atwood of the District of
Columbia Bar (an article based upon his remarks follows on page 609); Mark R. Joelson;
Professor Lawrence R. Velvel of the Catholic University School of Law, and Professor Don
Wallace, Jr., Director, Institute for International and Foreign Trade, Georgetown University
Law Center.
t Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice.
A.B., Princeton University; LL.B., Columbia University.
' Address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Seventh Special Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, September 1, 1975.
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and achieved in specific application. That is what I shall examine in this
article, focusing particularly on the developments of the last four years.
I will concentrate primarily on the enforcement activities of the Department
of Justice, but will also discuss actions taken by the Federal Trade Com-
mission and certain cases and rulings in private antitrust litigation.
The Antitrust Division has filed over a dozen international antitrust
cases in the last four years. Many of these were brought by the Foreign
Commerce Section which specializes in such matters; most of the others
were developed by the field offices of the Division. A brief description
of some of these cases will indicate their very considerable variety.
Two companies which sell the light metal lithium were accused in
1974 of allocating world markets by agreeing to pay each other a 5
percent commission if the American firms sold in Europe or the German
firm sold into the United States. The case was settled by means of a decree
prohibiting repetition of the conduct.' An association of Korean wig
importers in New York was indicted for attempting to boycott all wig
merchants who refused to join the association and who continued to
deal with price cutters. The association pled no contest to the criminal
charge, paid a fine and agreed to an injunction.' Twenty-one American
publishers were sued for cooperating with an arrangement of British
publishers to divide world markets so as to give the British exclusive rights
to re-publication in commonwealth countries while the Americans received
such rights to the United States, Canada and the Philippines.' This case
was settled by a combination of diplomatic negotiation and the entry of
a voluntary consent decree. Still another case involved the indictment of
the largest American and British manufacturers of bank security equipment,
Diebold Corporation and Chubb & Sons, Ltd., charging them with having
agreed to cancel distributors in each other's home territories.5 Diebold
pled no contest and paid a $30,000 fine. In a recently settled case, associ-
ations of American mink ranchers were charged with inducing their
Scandinavian competitors to decrease exports of mink pelts to the United
States.6
In other recent antitrust prosecutions the Department of Justice
charged the DeBeers diamond firm with fixing resale prices and allocating
markets in conjunction with its American and European distributors. DeBeers
2 United States v. Foote Mineral Co., Civ. No. 74-1652 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
3 United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass'n of America, Cr. No. 75-622, Civ. No. 75-3069
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
4 United States v. Addison Wesley Publishing Co., Cr. No. 74-5176 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5 United States v. Diebold, Inc. and Chubb & Son, Ltd., Cr. No. 76-9A (N.D. Ohio 1976).6 United States v. National Bd. of Fur Farm Organizations, 395 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Wis.
1974).
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first challenged jurisdiction and then voluntarily appeared before the court
and paid a $40,000 fine.' The Omega Watch Company was charged with
conspiring with its American distributor to stem the flow of discount
Omega watches to the United States. Omega agreed to discontinue the prac-
tice.'
Not all enforcement actions involve new cases. The Quinine Cartel
case was filed in 1968, but a German defendant, Boehringer, finally agreed
in 1976 to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and accepted a consent
decree.' This was because of the firm's desire to enter the U.S. market by
acquiring an American company. In the same case, the Antitrust Division,
with the cooperation of immigration authorities and the FBI, secured the
arrest of a Dutch defendant six years after he had failed to appear for
arraignment. He was compelled to post $100,000 bail'
These instances indicate why it has been the position of the United
States in international discussions that our national antitrust laws are usually
adequate to protect us even from antitrust violations by foreign firms.
Another enforcement action of interest in regard to an older case is the
settlement negotiated in the 1968 Gillette-Braun merger case and approved
by the court in 1975.11 The suit had charged that by acquiring the Braun
razor company of West Germany, Gillette had prevented the competitive
entry of Braun's high quality electric razors into the American market. The
settlement requires Gillette to bestow at least $2.5 million on a new firm
which will introduce these electric razors into the American market. Gillette
is then required to sell this new company to an independent purchaser.
In my view, the two most significant international antitrust cases
brought by the Division in the last few years are those involving potash
fertilizer and the Arab blacklist of pro-Israeli firms. In the first of these,
the grand jury indicted five multinational firms for cooperating in a scheme
to coordinate American production and prices of potash fertilizer with
production limitations and floor prices which were being instigated in
Canada by the Provincial Government of Saskatchewan.'" In the other
case, a major American construction firm was charged with effectuating
7 United States v. DeBeers Indus. Diamond Div., Ltd., Cr. No. 74-1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
s United States v. Norman Morris Corp., Civ. No. 76-495 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
9 United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche, Cr. No. 68-870 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a discussion
of jurisdictional problems with foreign defendants, see [1974-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) f 75,434,
at 98,459 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1974).
10 See 690 ANTTRusT & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Nov. 26, 1974).
11United States v. The Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975) (modified consent
decree affirmed). See [1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,651, at 67,838 (D. Mass. Dec. 30,
1975).
12 United States v. Amax, Cr. No. 76-783 (N.D. 111. 1976).
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the Arab League boycott of Israel in the United States by agreeing with
subcontractors not to deal with any firm in the United States which was on the
Arab League's blacklist."3
During the last few years, the Federal Trade Commission's enforce-
ment activities in the international antitrust area have centered primarily
in the merger field. The Commission has found illegal the proposed merger
between British Oxygen, the largest United Kingdom firm in the liquid
oxygen field, and Airco, the third largest American firm. The grounds
for the decision were that the merger would have eliminated potential
competition between British Oxygen and the American firm it acquired.1"
The case is on appeal. The FTC has also challenged the acquisition of
Stouffer Foods Company by the Swiss firm, Nestle, contending that the
acquisition eliminated significant competition in the production and sale
of specialized frozen food products.15
The Commission has been active not only in the merger area but
also in the field of international licensing. It challenged agreements between
Xerox Corporation and its English and Japanese licensees on the ground
that the licensing and contractual arrangements eliminated significant actual
and potential competition between the firms involved. The settlement re-
quires Xerox to adopt new policies in regard to international licensing,
pricing and sales."6
Despite the varied nature of these prosecutions, certain generalizations
can be ventured. First, there are just as many cases involving firms which
are not giant multinational corporations as there are cases in which such
firms are involved. The large international firms do not seem to have any
monopoly at all of the tendency to violate the antitrust laws. Second, the
cases involved American defendants, foreign defendants, or both. There is
no indication of any tendency to favor either group or to be prejudiced
against anyone. Third, there are no suits brought in the last three years
-- or in fact in the last twenty-five years-against joint ventures by Americans
to sell a product abroad or construct a facility in a foreign country. There
was concern in the 1950's and 60's that U.S. antitrust enforcement might
prejudice the ability of American firms to engage in such activities, but
that concern seems to have been unfounded. In fact, besides not suing
any foreign joint ventures, the Antitrust Division also recently granted a
"1 United States v. Bechtel Corp., Civ. No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
'4 FTC v. British Oxygen, Civ. No. 74-31 (D. Del. 1974) (FTC dkt. no. 8955).
15 Nestle Alimentana, S.A., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,808
(Jan. 7, 1975) (FTC dkt. no. 9003).
16In re Xerox Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) f 20,801
(July, 1975) (FTC dkt. no. 8909).
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business review clearance to a consortium of U.S. firms desiring to bid
jointly on a South American hydroelectric project. 17 Fourth, there are
only a few cases challenging international mergers. This is reflective of
the highly selective nature of American merger enforcement. Over the
last ten years only one large merger out of every 100 has been challenged
under the antitrust laws. The same percentage - 1 in 100 - applies to
challenges to large mergers between American and foreign firms.
Another trend which can be discerned in recent antitrust litigation,
both government and private, is the involvement of some foreign governmen-
tal agencies in cartel situations. In the potash and Arab blacklist cases,
private firms are charged with actions which extend a foreign, govern-
mentally sponsored cartel beyond even its arguably legitimate limits. Because
of sovereign immunity considerations, it is doubtful that U.S. antitrust
laws apply directly to foreign government cartels, but our antitrust laws
can be used to ensure that American companies do not agree to become
accomplices in carrying such cartels into U.S. territory.
Many of the private international antitrust cases of the last few years
have also involved questions of governmental involvement and possible
defenses arising from that circumstance. In Buttes Oil & Gas Co. v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp.," the District Court for the Central District of
California held that one American oil firm could not secure an antitrust
recovery from another because of an alleged conspiracy to induce one
Arab sheik to claim and seize the foreign oil territory which had allegedly
been granted to the plaintiff oil firm. In cases brought by New York City
area utilities and by the Bunker Hunt Oil Co. against a group of major
oil companies doing business in the Middle East, the courts sustained
defenses based on the Act of State doctrine, holding that the companies had
a right to bargain jointly with Libya, and were not responsible for any
injury to purchasers or rival companies which resulted from the seizure
of the oil by Libya or by efforts of the companies to refrain from purch-
asing or assisting in the sale of the oil which had been expropriated from
them by Libya. 9 These cases seem to indicate that American courts
remain reluctant to question the legitimacy of a foreign act of state taken
abroad, or the right of American companies, even acting jointly, to seek
17 United States Department of Justice Press Release, May 10, 1976 (re Burns and Roe, Inc.).
1s 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
:9 Nelson Bunker Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., Civ. No. 75-1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The district
court had personal jurisdiction over a West German firm whose officials came to New York
to sign documents. See [1975-2] Trade Cas (CCH) f 60,558, at 67,445 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
1975). For grounds on which some of defendants' motions to dismiss were granted, see
[1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,591, at 67,604 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1975).
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favorable action from foreign sovereigns or bargain jointly with such
sovereigns. On the other hand, dicta in a recent Supreme Court case,
Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, suggests that a majority of the members
of the Supreme Court accept the need for distinguishing between the
commercial activities of a state and its legitimately sovereign activities."0
Activities such as granting of exclusive rights to oil lands or expropriation
are still regarded as sovereign aitivities, but there is considerable doubt
whether the production and sale of commodities on international markets
would be regarded in U.S. courts as a sovereign activity rather than a
commercial one. It should also be noted that in the private Cofinco case,
which involved alleged price manipulation of Angolan coffee in the New York
market, the court was unwilling to dismiss the complaint based on an
Act of State defense, since evidence appeared to exist indicating that much
of the challenged conduct was in the United States and was commercial
in nature."
As if to emphasize that foreign states do not inevitably come out
on the short end of American antitrust law, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently ruled that foreign sovereigns who purchase illegally price-
fixed goods from American manufacturers may sue as persons entitled to
treble damages under the Clayton Antitrust Act. In a "friend of the court"
brief, the Department of Justice supported the right of foreign states to
sue in our courts.2
A brief review such as this has to be more suggestive than definitive.
Still, it is clear that the international antitrust area is an active and growing
field of litigation. It is almost inevitable that vigorous antitrust enforcement
in any area will generate discussion and even controversy. Nevertheless,
it should be kept in mind that there is no indication, even in the recent
period of high antitrust activity, that the enforcement of our antitrust laws
is interfering with the normal and profitable conduct of American business
overseas or prejudicing healthy commercial relationships with other nations.
On the contrary, antitrust acts as a constant reminder to all those engaged
in our trade that America is committed to free competition, to open markets
and to fair dealing.
20 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
21 Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., Civ. No. 74-5191 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (motion to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue denied). See [1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH)
T 60,456, at 67,051 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1975).
22 Pfizer, Inc. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). See also [1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,455, at 67,045 (8th Cir. Aug. 27, 1975).
[V/ol. 0:4
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/2
